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‘Don’t read the comments!’  







I have found it difficult to know where to begin a response to two reviews that succeed in 
being both enormously generous and fully engaged with the work that forms the basis of 
Murder, Medicine and Motherhood.  It is a standard academic joke that we should count 
our blessings if our research is read by long-suffering family members and one or two of 
those in our field.  With Eve Darian-Smith and Mehera San Roque as my allotted readers, 
I am blessed indeed.
1
  The two reviews published in feminists@law are particularly 
exciting for me as they are written by women whose research accomplishments offer 
aspirational models for my own work.  In a world in which the work of writing reviews 
tends to be under-valued, it is a particularly feminist act not just to review a book, but to 
write the review as richly and carefully as these two pieces have been written.  I will try 
to do justice to Darian-Smith and San Roque’s engagement in my response.  As well as 
responding to Darian-Smith and San Roque’s insights, I have also taken this invitation as 
an opportunity to reflect a little on the experience of writing Murder, Medicine and 
Motherhood, and on its reception. 
In the next section, I trace the choices and unanticipated challenges that structured my 
research for Murder, Medicine and Motherhood.  Both Darian-Smith and San Roque 
have commented on this methodology, and I have noticed that after publication, the scope 
and content of the finished product of a research project can seem inevitable.  In this 
section I try to unpack that appearance, because I think that there can be value in trying to 
remember why certain choices were made at certain times, and in pondering the accidents 
that prompt turns within one’s work.
2
 The following section considers the transition that 
takes place when a published work enters the field and in fact changes the topic of 
research in certain ways.  Given the media attention that my conclusions have attracted 
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of articles for feminists@law. 
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and the possibility that Kathleen Folbigg’s case may now be reviewed, Murder, Medicine 
and Motherhood has to some extent had this effect.  In the course of my work becoming a 
more public product, my conclusions and my sense of myself as an academic have also 
been challenged at times.  The rewards and perils of media engagement form a topic that 
is occasionally discussed in the literature,
3
 but rarely with regard to explicitly feminist 
work.  Given that academics are increasingly exhorted by our employers and research 
funding agencies to demonstrate the public relevance of our work, and to engage with 
mass media, it seems important to consider the possibilities and the pitfalls of such 
engagement from a feminist perspective. 
 
Methodology: A mixture of choice and chance 
I am occasionally asked how I chose to focus on the Folbigg trial.  The project that 
became Murder, Medicine and Motherhood did not begin as a study of a single case.  In 
2004, as I proposed the doctoral research on which the book was ultimately based, the 
English courts, Home Office, Royal College of Paediatrics and Child Health, and Royal 
College of Pathologists were responding to the realization that justice had failed Sally 
Clark and Angela Cannings.  Trupti Patel had been acquitted.  Donna Anthony’s 
exoneration soon followed, as did a number of reports that sought to understand the 
variety of errors that had contributed to these wrongful convictions and to prevent their 
recurrence.
4
  However, with the notable exception of Fiona Raitt and Suzanne Zeedyck’s 
insightful article on Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy, very little of the commentary on 
these cases explored why mothers had been the subject of these errors.
5
   
Meanwhile in Canada, one had to look more closely, but there were glimpses that all was 
not well with child homicide prosecutions in Ontario.  Judgments had been issued either 
acquitting parents and caregivers charged with killing children (and criticizing expert 
witnesses along the way),
6
 or staying prosecutions.
7
  In other cases, prosecutions had 
                                                 
3
 Two of the best examples are Michael McCann and William Haltom, Distorting the Law: Politics, Media 
and the Litigation Crisis (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004) and Austin Sarat and Susan Silbey, 
“The Pull of the Policy Audience” (1988) 10 Law & Policy 97. 
4
 See for example Helene Kennedy, Sudden Unexpected Death in Infancy: A Multi-Agency Protocol for 
Care and Investigation (London: Royal College of Pathologists and Royal College of Paediatrics and Child 
Health, 2004); Royal Statistical Society, Peter Green, Letter from the President to the Lord Chancellor 




 Fiona Raitt and Suzanne Zeedyck, “Mothers on Trial: Discourses of Cot Death and Munchausen’s 
Syndrome by Proxy” (2004) 12 Feminist Legal Studies 257. 
6
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been withdrawn by the Crown, in some instances after trials had begun.
8
  In Australia, 
coincidence evidence against Tracey Phillips had been excluded by a NSW Supreme 
Court Judge, resulting in a withdrawal of charges,
9
 and charges had been laid against 
Carol Matthey for killing four children.
10
  Kathleen Folbigg had, of course, been 
convicted and sentenced for killing her four children.   
It was apparent that serious battles were taking place in courtrooms around infant death, 
and mothers seemed the most vulnerable participants in these cases (though fathers and 
other caregivers were also affected, especially in Canada).  It was less clear why these 
cases were emerging in several jurisdictions at about the same time.  The initial goal of 
this project was to understand where this particular trend had come from, to explore how 
it might be linked to changing expectations of both motherhood and medical science, and 
to think about the connections between these cases and the broader literature on 
criminalization.
11
   
The motherhood aspect of the cases seemed crucial to me, from at least two points of 
view.  First, taking seriously Carol Smart’s suggestion that legal discourse helps to 
produce gendered subject identities, I worried about the effects of a turn towards the 
punitive in criminal law’s approach to motherhood – and I saw troubling connections 
between criminal law and other fields such as family law and welfare law in this regard.
12
  
What disciplining effects might these cases have on other mothers?  Secondly, I was also 
struck by Shelley Gavigan’s rejoinder to Smart – her suggestion that seeing women 
within law as purely a discursive construction overlooked the importance of lived 
experience, leaving women with ‘neither agency nor experience’ beyond the discursive 
construction of their lives.
13
  I was interested in both how law produces authoritative 
                                                                                                                                                 
7
 R v Kporwodu & Veno (2003), 176 C.C.C. (3d) 97 (Ont. S.C.J.), aff'd (2005), 195 C.C.C. (3d) 501 (Ont. 
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8
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Stephen T Goudge, Report of the Inquiry into Pediatric Forensic Pathology Services in Ontario (Toronto: 
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9
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10
 “Authorities were Told of Child Deaths” The Age (29 August 2003) 1. 
11
 For example, David Garland, The Culture of Control: Crime and Social Order (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2001); Jonathon Simon, Governing through Crime Metaphors (2002) 67 Brooklyn Law 
Review 1035.  I was also cognizant of the criticisms that had been made by feminists of the inattention to 
gender within the criminalization literature.  For example Lorraine Gelsthorpe, “Female Offending: A 
Theoretical Overview” in G. McIvor (ed.) Women Who Offend (London: Jessica Kingsley, 2004) at 76. 
12
 Carol Smart, “The Woman of Legal Discourse” (1992) 1 Social & Legal Studies 1 at 29. 
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 Shelley Gavigan, “Mothers, Other Mothers and Others: The Legal Contradictions and Challenges of 
Lesbian Parenting” in Dorothy Chunn and Dany Lacombe (eds) Law as a Gendering Practice (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2000) 100 at 105. 






subject identities for women and in how these authorized identities might depart 




I knew I wanted to look at trial transcripts and court records, because I had a sense that 
they offered the material from which one might be able to challenge the fluency of law’s 
authorized narratives regarding facts and culpability, and I suspected I would need to 
mount that challenge at times.  The legal archive seemed an obvious starting point for 
understanding more about cases than one can learn by reading judgments.  However, very 
little was written about how one should approach the task of analyzing transcripts and 
court records.  Accordingly much of my first eighteen months was spent developing a 
workable process by analogy with qualitative research methods borrowed mostly from 
sociology and history – and influenced especially by the feminist institutional 
ethnographies of Dorothy E. Smith.
15
   
A further challenge was presented by difficulties of access.  Access problems, which 
seem anecdotally to be widespread, but are too rarely described in published work, 
excluded the English cases from close analysis, and plagued my attempts to investigate 
Matthey.
16
  The NSW Court Registry was, by contrast, willing to allow me access to its 
records in Folbigg and Phillips and able (for a fee) to make copies of those documents I 
wished to retain. 
In Ontario, strong principles of open justice offered a more stable route to accessing court 
records.  However, concerns about child homicide cases progressed during 2005 to the 
point where the Office of the Chief Coroner for Ontario announced that he would 
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 I have written more about these concerns in Emma Cunliffe, “(This is not a) Story: Using Court Records 
to Explore Judicial Narratives in R. v. Kathleen Folbigg” (2007) 27 Australian Feminist Law Journal 71 
and with Angela Cameron in “Writing the Circle: Judicially Convened Sentencing Circles and the Textual 
Organization of Criminal Justice” (2007) 19 Canadian Journal of Women and the Law 1. 
15
 Dorothy Smith, Institutional Ethnography: A Sociology for People (Lanham MD: AltaMira Press, 2005); 
Dorothy Smith (ed.) Institutional Ethnography as Practice (Lanham MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2006).  
An article by Stephen Robertson also proved invaluable.  Stephen Robertson, “What’s Law Got to Do with 
It? Legal Records and Sexual Histories” (1995) 14 Journal of the History of Sexuality 161. 
16
 The English Court of Appeal denied my request for access to the Clark and Cannings files on the basis 
that it considered a PhD to be a personal project, and presumably therefore exempt from the principles of 
open justice.  Challenging this decision was beyond my resources.  Later in the study, the Victorian 
Supreme Court returned all exhibits used in R v Matthey to the parties immediately after Coldrey J issued 
his judgment criticizing the prosecution evidence and the expert testimony offered in R v Matthey (see 
[2007] VSC 398).  These exhibits had been used in open court and would otherwise have been available for 
inspection as part of the court record.  I had access to the transcripts of argument in the Supreme Court, and 
the transcripts of the committal hearing.  However, without the exhibits, it would be difficult to perform a 
complete analysis of the case.  These experiences eventually prompted me to write an article about the 
concept and importance of open justice: Emma Cunliffe, “Open Justice: Concepts and Judicial 
Approaches” (2012) 40(3) Federal Law Review 385. 
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commission a review of all criminally suspicious cases in which pathologist Charles 
Smith had been involved.
17
  This review concluded that there were serious errors in 20 of 
45 cases, and the Goudge Inquiry was announced while the Ontario Court of Appeal and 
Supreme Court of Canada began to review individual appeals.  This was welcome news 
for the parents and caregivers who believed that they had been wrongly convicted or 
unfairly accused of killing children, and those who supported their cause.  It also made 
researching these cases much more of a moving target.   
In the end, after much worry, and many consultations with my PhD committee, we 
decided that I would focus on a close analysis of the Australian cases and draw the 
English and Canadian cases in for context rather than direct study.  I obtained copies of 
large portions of the Folbigg and Phillips files, and set to work persuading the Victorian 
courts to give me, at least, the transcripts in Matthey.  By mid-2007, I had all of these 
materials.  I also had the sense from time spent with the documents in the court registry 
that Folbigg was different from the other cases – the Crown evidence was more 
troubling, more complicated, perhaps more evenly weighted.  I decided to write a chapter 
for the imagined dissertation explaining the Folbigg case.  After it had been drafted, I met 
again with my committee and much to my relief my supervisor suggested that I focus 
solely on Folbigg going forward.  Six years later, the ‘progression’ of my PhD 
dissertation from nine cases in three jurisdictions, to three cases in one jurisdiction, to 
focusing on a single trial is a subject of amusement among my committee – but at the 
time, it felt like an enormous gamble to write about ‘only one case’.   
Another thing I hadn’t anticipated when I began the project was that it might take me 
deep into the published medical literature.  However it became apparent from early 
reviews of the expert testimony that it would be helpful to read the cited material.  This 
led me to wonder how that material fitted with a broader field of medical research and 
ultimately I read everything I could find about the relationship between SIDS and 
homicide.  Reviewing this literature, seeking to understand individual conclusions, the 
limits of those conclusions and the intellectual genealogy of a body of work as a whole, 
took months and required me to develop a somewhat different set of skills from those I 
had so far used to analyze the court record.  I was fortunate to find Sheila Jasanoff’s 
work
18
 and that of Gary Edmond
19
 early in my research, as their (slightly different) 
conceptualizations of the relationships between legal and expert knowledges became the 
theoretical scaffolding that structured my approach to both the medical literature and the 
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MA: Harvard University Press, 1995). 
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 See the works cited below, note 20. 






expert witnesses’ work in Folbigg.  Edmond’s early work on expert testimony offered a 
model for careful analysis of the claims and discursive contests within experts’ work in 
court.
20
  Linking that literature to Smith’s idea that institutional knowledge circulates 
through texts and is activated by the work of people
21
 gave me a sense that it might prove 
fruitful to trace the connections and interruptions between published medical research, 
expert reports and testimony.   
This combination of methodological choice and theoretical approach informed my 
conclusions in Murder, Medicine and Motherhood and ultimately led particularly to the 
recommendations I have made for managing expert evidence.  I am heartened that San 
Roque finds these suggestions pragmatic and capable of ready implementation even as I 
am conscious that, requiring courts to re-conceptualize expert knowledge, they are 
unlikely to be fully embraced in the near future.  Nonetheless, I think the concept of 
double counting – the idea that courts should be attentive to the possibility that expert 
opinions are informed by the very adverse behavioural evidence and implicit prejudice 
that is often relied upon by triers of fact to ‘validate’ those opinions – is an important one, 
and I will explore it further in future work. 
I make a point of relating the ‘backstory’ to my doctoral work each year to the graduate 
students I teach in my methodologies class, because I think it illustrates the ways in 
which research projects are shaped by accidents and opportunities.  I make a point of 
telling the story here because Darian-Smith has praised my methodological approach for 
its range and for the way in which it is integrated with my theoretical lens.  The 
methodological challenges presented by this project seemed immense at times, and if I 
have succeeded in meeting those challenges, it is at least partly because I had a 
supervisory committee – Susan B. Boyd, Wesley Pue, Christine Boyle and Dorothy 
Chunn – who encouraged me to be flexible and creative in my approach, and to persevere 
with empirical work in the face of unexpected difficulties.  I am very grateful to them for 
the trust they placed in me as I found a way through it all. 
 
Transitions:  From academic work to media engagement 
As I was preparing the book for final publication, I faced two decisions that I found 
difficult.  First, how bluntly would I state my conclusion that Kathleen Folbigg had been 
wrongly convicted?  Secondly, what steps could and should I take to draw attention to my 
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 Gary Edmond, “Azaria’s Accessories: The Social (Legal-Scientific) Construction of the Chamberlains’ 
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conclusions?  As I have already identified, Folbigg’s trial seemed in certain respects 
better managed than many of the trials that were approximately contemporaneous with it.  
The trial judge did not permit expert medical witnesses to testify directly to the dogma 
that the presence of multiple deaths in a given family suggested murder, reasoning that 
this opinion was based on common sense rather than expertise.
22
  Nonetheless, I found 
that this logic entered the trial in invidious ways, some of which made this reasoning 
more difficult for the defence to contest than might have been the case if the opinion had 
simply been directly attested to.
23
  There were, additionally, strong hints that some of the 
experts were influenced by Kathleen Folbigg’s diaries and perhaps by other inculpatory 
evidence when they testified about cause of death in individual children.  Craig Folbigg, 
Kathleen’s estranged husband, likewise changed his testimony in a way that was 
considerably more damning than his previous statements to police and Crown.  The 
diaries were used by the Crown prosecutor in a manner that could well have left the jury 
uncertain about what Kathleen Folbigg wrote, and how Tedeschi (the prosecutor) 
interpreted those entries.  All of these strategies were troubling, and each proved difficult 
for the defence to counter at trial.   
While recognizing that this was a difficult case to defend, I was also somewhat critical of 
some of the choices that had been made by Folbigg’s defence team at trial.  Most 
particularly, when the Crown suggested that the jury could use Folbigg’s interest in 
physical fitness, or her evenings out with friends, or her occasional desire to work outside 
the home, or her frustration at Craig’s refusal to help with household chores to discern a 
possible motive for her to kill her children, the defence responded by suggesting that 
these hadn’t been Folbigg’s true desires at all.  As a feminist (frankly, as an adult woman 
living in an OECD country), it seemed astonishing to me that the defence had not also 
challenged the Crown’s reasoning.   
The notion that a reason to murder one’s children can be discerned from a desire to be fit, 
a concern about whether her husband would find her attractive when she felt overweight, 
a wish to share household work more equally or a desire to have her own money and to 
help secure the financial stability of her family seems absurd when decontextualized from 
its application to a woman who was already suspect by virtue of having lost four children 
and being charged with their murder.  The apparent salience of these (contested) facts 
demonstrates the importance of framing – they mattered because Folbigg had lost her 
children and because she was charged with murder.  The possibility that this reasoning 
might put the cart before the horse was never adequately addressed at trial.  Rather, in the 
context of the trial, the bizarreness of the Crown’s logic went largely unchallenged and 
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Motherhood at 73-79. 






the logic was at times actively supported by the defence strategy of accepting the 
category, but denying that Folbigg fitted within it.   
The defence was undoubtedly surprised by Craig Folbigg and Lea Bown’s
24
 testimony 
that Kathleen had occasionally been rough with Laura.  This testimony was at odds with 
prior statements, and was cross-examined on that basis.  Again, however, the defence 
didn’t squarely challenge the proposition that murderous tendencies can be discerned 
from, for example, holding down a child’s hands in frustration when she resists eating her 
breakfast – preferring instead to deny that such incidents had occurred.  Like San Roque, 
I am perturbed by the apparent ease with which the NSW Department of Public 
Prosecutions has leveraged a particularly punitive – at times misogynistic – vision of 
contemporary womanhood in the service of convicting women for crimes that may never 
have occurred, and by the implications that these strategies may have for every woman 
who struggles at times with the frustrations and loneliness of mothering.  It also troubles 
me that these moves were not targeted, and countered, by the defence at trial.  Yet these 
moves are not unique to Folbigg, nor even – as Clark and Cannings demonstrate – to 
NSW.  I suspect that they are rarely countered in criminal courts as strongly as they 
should be. 
There were also some positive indicia of factual innocence in Kathleen Folbigg’s case.  
In Cannings, the English Court of Appeal made much of the fact that none of Cannings’ 
children had any signs of smothering on autopsy: 
It is of course possible to smother a baby without leaving any physical signs discernible on 
medical examination or at post mortem. Nevertheless, given that all four children were said 
by the Crown to have been subjected to violence sufficient to cause death, the absence of 
any physical signs of injury was somewhat surprising. There was no fresh copious bleeding 
in the lungs of the dead children, and no petechial haemorrhage. There were no pressure 
marks to show as reddening in the area of the mouth and nose, nor blood or bloodstained 
fluid in the nose. No bruises were discovered on the outer skin surface, or indeed 
subcutaneously. The fraenulum, in each case, was undamaged.
25
 
The four Folbigg children were likewise free from all signs of foul play.  This was 
important in aggregate, and perhaps most striking in relation to Laura, who was well 
above the age at which it is normally considered possible to smother an infant without 
detection, and whose autopsy was conducted by a pathologist who strongly suspected 
homicide based on the family history.  Each of the children was autopsied, and in two 
cases (Patrick and Laura) investigating doctors identified a plausible natural cause of 
death at the time of autopsy.  In relation to both of these children, doctors testified at trial 
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in a manner that was inconsistent with earlier conclusions, but without explaining the 
reasons for their change of opinion.  In fact, the jury would have had to work hard to 
realize that the medical opinions had changed at all. 
Likewise, Folbigg had none of the risk factors identified in the literature as predisposing 
a mother to smothering her children.  This remains true even when one includes studies 
that have been criticized as being unduly suspicious of women.
26
  Craig Folbigg did not 
suspect Kathleen of having killed their children until he spoke to police and subsequently 
read Kathleen’s diaries after she had left him, and them, in the marital home.  When 
Craig told Kathleen that he had suggested to police that Kathleen may have killed their 
children, Kathleen told Craig to go back to the police station and ‘tell them the truth’.
27
  
The Crown case at trial was that Folbigg killed her children and then immediately raised 
the alarm.  The Crown made much of some evidence that the two children who died at 
night were found by Folbigg as she went to the toilet – San Roque has quoted Tedeschi’s 
sarcastic comment about Folbigg’s bodily functions.  There was conflicting evidence 
about whether the children’s bodies were cool to the touch when they were found – but 
this was not drawn to the court’s attention.  It is clear from the 2007 appeal that this 
factor mattered to some jurors (and to the NSW Court of Criminal Appeal).
28
   
Collectively, the lack of physical signs of foul play after careful assessment; the presence 
of positive indicia of natural causes; the lack of risk factors; the possibility that the bodies 
of the children who were found at night were cool to the touch when attended by 
ambulance personnel; the lack of suspicion of Folbigg by her closest family and friends; 
and her immediate response to the revelation that she was now suspect, suggest that there 
may be good reasons to believe that Folbigg did not kill her children.   
When I was writing the manuscript that became Murder, Medicine and Motherhood, I 
was not particularly looking for evidence of factual innocence, or even for evidence of an 
error that could found a claim of wrongful conviction.  I was, as I have already noted, 
interested in what prompted the trend towards charging mothers who suffered multiple 
infant death, keen to understand the implication of changing concepts of motherhood and 
medical science in this trend, and I hoped to investigate the links between these matters 
and the criminalization literature. I am grateful to Darian-Smith and San Roque for 
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 This research is discussed at length in chapter five of Murder, Medicine and Motherhood.  Perhaps, 
Kathleen Folbigg’s early childhood could be interpreted as constituting a difficult upbringing.  Barr J 
construed her history in this way when sentencing Folbigg (R v Folbigg [2003] NSWSC 895).  However, 
by most accounts she was a relatively settled child and teenager and one should be careful before 
generalizing from an infant history to adult findings of criminal guilt when there is an intervening period of 
unexceptionable behaviour and a capacity to form personal relationships. 
27
 Craig testified at trial that he interpreted this direction as a coded injunction to lie to police.   
28
 R v Folbigg [2007] NSWCCA 371 at para 8 and 56-9. 






focusing on these dimensions of the book in their comments.  They remain, for me, the 
core of the academic project and the factors that will continue to animate my work.  
However, in light of the evidence that militated against Folbigg’s guilt, I decided to state 
clearly that I believed Folbigg had been wrongly convicted.  NSW does not have any 
corresponding institution to the Criminal Cases Review Commission, and so the question 
of what might happen next was far from clear.   
I did not correspond with Folbigg until the proofs were finalised.  When the contract with 
Hart was signed, however, I reached the conclusion that it was important to alert Folbigg 
to my conclusions and offer to send a copy of the book to her.
29
 The letter I received in 
response put the essential conundrum I now faced into devastating clarity.  Rather than 
protesting her ill treatment within the justice system, Folbigg wrote: ‘If this is purely for 
publication … then I would appreciate being informed of this.  As hope can destroy as 
much as enliven ones soul.’  Receiving this letter, I was aware of both my relative lack of 
capacity to offer practical help – as an academic lawyer working in another country, with 
no practising certificate – and of the enormous privilege I enjoy by virtue of my 
education and institutional position.  I resolved to do what I could to find Folbigg a 
lawyer who could act on her behalf, and that I would also try to draw the media’s 
attention to my conclusions.   
Murder, Medicine and Motherhood is deeply critical of the press coverage of Folbigg’s 
trial.  Based on my quantitative and qualitative analysis of that coverage, I concluded that 
the press systematically ignored the challenges made by various witnesses to the Crown 
narrative of the case, and thereby presented an imbalanced account of the evidence in 
Folbigg’s trial.  My decision to try to enlist the media’s help to reverse the conviction felt 
ironic, at best.  Dorothy Chunn, who has taught me so much about media and media 
analysis, assured me however that the press would care less about consistency in its own 
reporting than it would about the newsworthiness of a credible claim that Folbigg may 
have been wrongly convicted.  Her prediction proved right, and my efforts resulted in 
several favourable stories, particularly in the Sydney Morning Herald.  The 60 Minutes 
and Alan Jones Show followed in mid-2013.  I hope, though I don’t yet know, that these 
stories will help Folbigg to persuade the court of public opinion that there may be more to 
her case than was first reported. 
As feminist scholars might anticipate, the journalists I have spoken to have been much 
more interested in the failures of institutional processes that formed part of the 
investigation and trial than they have been in my analysis of the ways in which Folbigg’s 
                                                 
29
 Debra Parkes and I had a number of conversations about whether to approach Folbigg, and if so by what 
means.  Her wisdom and her greater experience with women in prison were instrumental to the strategy we 
formulated, and I appreciate Debra’s generosity in helping me to find a suitable way to alert Folbigg of the 
book’s existence while ensuring that she had adequate support and that her privacy was respected. 
feminists@law   Vol 3, No 2 (2013) 





mothering was punitively enlisted against her.  This focus is consistent with the coverage 
afforded to Sally Clark, Angela Cannings, and the Canadian exonerees.  To the extent 
that a story of miscarriage of justice has gained traction in the media, it has largely 
excluded the concerns about the targeting and disciplining of women that San Roque 
articulates in her piece in this issue, and that I sought to raise in Murder, Medicine and 
Motherhood.  A feminist narrative has thereby been stripped out of a more conventional 
liberal account of the rational expectations of criminal justice and medical institutions.   
My experience of engaging with the media in Folbigg’s case resonates with the 
conclusions drawn by Dorothy Chunn, Susan Boyd and Hester Lessard in their study of 
feminism, law and social change.  Speaking about law reform, these authors observe that:  
While they never controlled the agenda-setting process, feminists have been active and 
influential to varying degrees in proposing and shaping socio-legal reform … However, the 
broader social and economic forces represented by neo-conservatism and neo-liberalism 
have an important mediating influence on the impact that feminism can achieve.
30
 
Chunn, Boyd and Lessard conclude that feminist successes have been strongest when 
feminists have found common cause, or strategic alliance, with strands of neo-
conservatism or neo-liberalism.  This conclusion has important ramifications for feminist 
academics, who are increasingly finding their performance judged against criteria such as 
‘impact’ – including the extent to which one’s work is embraced within political, judicial 
or public discourse.  The assumption that merit is the only criterion by which academic 
work will be judged within these spheres is unsettled by studies such as Chunn, Boyd and 
Lessard’s.   
In keeping with the media interest in ‘how it feels’ to experience reported events,
31
 60 
Minutes and the Sydney Morning Herald have also featured interviews with Kathleen 
Folbigg’s friends and foster sister.  While Folbigg’s foster sister remains convinced that 
Folbigg killed her children, her friends quietly supported her throughout her trial and 
imprisonment.  In this most recent phase, the media attention has been reconfigured and 
Folbigg’s friends have assumed a prominence that they did not have during the trial and 
appeals.  The implicit message being promoted appears to be that Folbigg’s friends are 
ordinary, loving women who are also mothers – and who cannot conceive that their 
friend committed the crimes of which she was convicted.  This aspect of the reportage 
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has exhumed Folbigg’s humanity in place of the ‘monster’ who was previously depicted 
in the media.
32
  It appeals to the emotional dimensions of the case – inviting readers to 
consider for the first time the awful possibility that Folbigg may first have lost four 
children, and then been wrongly convicted of killing them.  However, this reportage also 
sidesteps the question of how and why Folbigg was portrayed so differently by the 
prosecution and in the media in the initial phases of the case.  In particular, while the 
diaries have occasionally been reproduced and discussed in this media coverage, there 
has been relatively little sustained consideration of the role they might have played in 
Folbigg’s mothering and her grief about her children’s deaths.  The observations that I 
made in Murder, Medicine and Motherhood about the implications of the privatization 
and gendering of responsibility for early childhood, and the ways in which this 
responsibility has been harnessed by Crown prosecutors to the task of rendering some 
mothers suspect,
33
 have (predictably) been wholly ignored within the media coverage.  
San Roque’s piece in this issue demonstrates the extent to which such prosecution 
strategies are, in fact, reinforced by the media coverage of cases in which women are 
prosecuted for homicide. 
 
Works in progress 
As I prepare this response, the final chapter of Folbigg’s case remains incomplete.  The 
moderate success of efforts made by several people to draw attention to concerns about 
the evidence given at Folbigg’s trial provides some reason to hope that the convictions 
may be reviewed.  However, the mechanism by which this may happen remains unclear.  
Having exhausted normal avenues of appeal, Folbigg’s quandary illuminates the 
inadequacy of NSW’s mechanisms for criminal review. As San Roque and Gary Edmond 
have argued, Folbigg’s case and others also demonstrate that the ethical obligations 
imposed on prosecutors and experts do not substitute for vigilant judicial oversight of the 
evidence introduced against criminal defendants.
34
  I will continue to do what I can to 
draw my conclusions to the attention of those who may be in a position to review 
Folbigg’s convictions.  Despite the positive reception my work has enjoyed, Folbigg 
remains in prison, locked in a protective ward in a maximum security women’s facility 
that is housed inside a men’s prison on the outskirts of Sydney.   
While I work to correct the injustice that has been done in Folbigg’s case, however, I am 
grateful to Darian Smith and San Roque for focusing on the systemic implications of my 
                                                 
32
 Murder, Medicine and Motherhood, chapter eight.   
33
 Murder, Medicine and Motherhood, chapter six, particularly 104-16. 
 
34
 San Roque, this issue.  See also Gary Edmond and Mehera San Roque, “The Cool Crucible: Forensic 
Science and the Frailty of the Criminal Trial” (2012) 24 Current Issues in Criminal Justice 51. 
feminists@law   Vol 3, No 2 (2013) 





research.  These implications extend to the relationships between punitive visions of 
motherhood, medical opinions that are deeply imbricated with social stereotypes, and 
legal processes in which existing checks and balances have failed to prevent errors from 
occurring.  Taking a broader view of the failures that led to wrongful convictions in 
England, Canada and Australia permits the Folbigg case to be seen not as an aberration, 
but as a telling instance of the failures of contemporary conceptions of the relationships 
between gender, crime and truth-seeking.  While such discussions may find their greatest 
resonance within academic circles, I remain convinced that they offer the most fruitful 
path towards a more egalitarian model of fact determination in difficult criminal trials.  
 
 
